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Abstract 
 
The Singapore government’s recent strategic plan to develop the financial sector has 
placed much emphasis on the fund management industry.  In this paper we examine the 
unit trust performance in Singapore in the 90s.  Our results show that fund managers in 
general performed poorly in security analysis and market timing.  However, they 
performed fairly well in risk-adjusted returns and generally maintained well-diversified 
portfolios.  We find that there is little consistency in the performance ranking of the 
evaluated portfolios, although there is evidence of repeat performance of some top funds. 
Our analysis also shows that fund managers could indeed make excess returns above the 
risk-free rate in the medium- to long-term.  Thus, unit trusts can be an ideal investment 
for small investors seeking sufficient diversification.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The extent of unit trusts’ penetration and establishment in an economy often 
mirrors the degree of development of its financial sector.1  For investors with modest 
means to participate in the stock market and with relatively low risk tolerance, unit trusts 
represent a natural investment consideration.  The recognition of the increasing 
dominance and importance of unit trusts as an investment instrument has spurred 
researchers to devise appropriate techniques to assess portfolio performance.  The earlier 
works by Sharpe (1966), Treynor (1965) and Jensen (1968) represent significant 
contributions to the evaluation of portfolio performance.  Most studies in the modern 
literature still utilize the theoretical frameworks of these pioneers as the basis of their 
analysis.  Certain advances have been made in various aspects.  Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989a) developed characteristic-based benchmarks to more efficiently mimic the trading 
environment of the portfolios.  Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1983) extended Jensen’s 
(1972) theoretical framework to more efficiently capture the market timing abilities of 
fund managers.  Ferson and Schadt (1996) proposed a Conditional Jensen Measure to 
factor in time-varying economic variables.  In addition, Grinblatt and Titman (1989b) 
proposed an alternative to the Jensen technique, called the Positive Period Weighting 
Measure, which seeks to assign weights to portfolio returns depending on the market 
returns of the period. 
Empirical studies on the performance of unit trusts in Singapore have been scanty.  
Notable exceptions are the works by Koh, Koh and Cheng (1990) and Koh, Phoon and 
Tan (1990).  These studies generally found poor ex-post performance of the unit trusts in 
terms of returns, risk-variance efficiency and the degree of diversification.  The poor 
                                                 
1 Unit trusts are generally called mutual funds in the US market.  As the term unit trust is commonly used in 
the Singapore market, we shall adopt this terminology in this paper. 
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performance of the unit trusts may itself account for the slow growth in the fund 
management industry in the 70s and 80s.  Today, the fund management industry is still 
relatively small, although it has seen tremendous growth in the 90s as Singapore strives to 
become the financial hub of the region. 
In this paper we examine the unit trust performance in Singapore in the 90s.  The 
unit trusts considered are restricted only to existing local funds with trading activities in 
Singapore and/or the Asian region.  The scope of the unit trusts considered and the 
methodology applied extend beyond previous works on the Singapore market.  Our 
objective is to provide an in-depth study of the fund management performance in a period 
when the industry experienced a healthy growth.  The blueprint of the Singapore 
government’s recent strategic plan to develop the financial sector has placed important 
focus on the fund management industry.  Thus, an evaluation of the performance of the 
industry cannot be over-emphasized. 
  Our results show that fund managers in general performed poorly in security 
analysis and market timing.  However, they performed fairly well in risk-adjusted returns 
and generally maintained well-diversified portfolios.  We find that there is little 
consistency in the performance ranking of the evaluated portfolios.  However, there is 
evidence of repeat performance of some top funds, which makes it possible to formulate 
long-term strategies to make supernormal profits.  Our analysis also shows that fund 
managers could indeed make excess returns above the risk-free rate in the medium- to 
long-term.  Thus, unit trusts can be an ideal investment for small investors seeking 
sufficient diversification.  
The plan of this paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we survey the recent 
developments of the unit trust industry in Singapore and the role it plays in the financial 
sector of the Singapore economy.  The various measures of fund performance used in the 
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paper are described in Section 3.  Section 4 discusses the issues of the compilation of the 
returns of the portfolios and the selection of benchmarks.  The empirical results are 
summarized in Section 5.  The implications of our findings and some issues related to the 
future development of the fund management industry in Singapore are covered in Section 
6.  Finally, the conclusions are summed up in Section 7. 
 
2.  The Unit Trust Industry in Singapore 
In the 90s, Singapore saw rapid expansions in the equity market.  In 1999, there 
were a total of 51 new listings.  However, this number pales in comparison to the growth 
of the fund management industry.  The industry saw a 35.6% growth in the number of 
funds, which went from 191 funds at the end of 1998 to 259 funds at the end of 1999.  
The number of asset management firms also increased by 20 to 189.  With such rates of 
growth, Singapore may eventually, like the US and Hong Kong, have more unit trusts 
than stocks listed in its exchange.  Yet, the growth was not limited to mere breadth.  The 
total assets in the fund managers’ portfolios swelled by 36% in the first half of 1999.  
This works out, according to the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), to be a 
massive $204.1 billion.2 Multiplying this figure by the average industry’s annual 
management fee rate of 1.25%, the fund management industry is currently worth an 
estimated $2.55 billion in annual income.  On the other hand, the current unit trust 
penetration rate in Singapore is only 3% to 4% of the population.  In contrast, the 
penetration rate in Hong Kong is 5% to 6%, while that in the US is a massive 48%.  This 
indicates the tremendous potential for growth in the fund management industry.  
                                                 
2 This amount includes funds managed for clients outside Singapore.   All figures quoted in this paper are in 
Singapore dollar.  The current exchange rate is about 1.73 S$ to 1 US$. 
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The MAS and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), the 
government’s largest investment arm, are in the process of releasing a total of $35 billion 
public funds over a few years for external fund managers to manage.  This massive 
injection of public funds reflects the government’s commitment to open up competition 
and transparency within the public sector.  This provides a strong psychological boost to 
the public’s confidence in fund managers and their investment products.  In addition, the 
Central Provident Fund3 (CPF) Investment Scheme for unit trusts was revamped to 
increase the number of quality asset managers and products available to CPF members.  
The end product of this is an increase in CPF-approved unit trusts from 21 in March 1998 
to 53 as in the first half of 1999.  With Singapore’s high savings rates, especially due to 
the large component contributed to the CPF, the pool of domestic funds available for 
professional management is set to get even larger. 
The government has focused its initial financial liberalization efforts largely on 
the fund management industry.  The industry receives such government support as it is an 
end user of a wide range of financial products, including foreign exchange, stock broking 
services, money and capital markets, and legal services in finance.  Currently, fund 
managers are also allowed to trade in derivatives but are restricted mainly for hedging 
purposes.  Several measures have been introduced to reform the brokerage and fund 
management industry to make them more competitive.  Appendix A provides a brief 
summary of the fee structure and tax regulations of the fund management industry.  As 
the population becomes more affluent and aware of the investment products available, 
traditional methods of savings, such as bank deposits and insurance, will be slowly 
                                                 
3 The Central Provident Fund is a fully-funded defined contribution (around 30% of income) required of the 
people working in Singapore. 
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replaced in part by professional fund management promising higher returns with modest 
risk exposure.  
Many recent studies on the fund performance of the Singapore market suffer from 
several shortcomings.  First, most studies make use of the typical end-of-month trading 
prices of the portfolios for their evaluation.  Though a convenient move, monthly prices 
may not adequately reflect the price volatility of the market in the 90s, especially during 
the volatile period of the Asian Crisis.  Second, many studies ignore the effects of 
dividend payments, which may have significant effects on fund performance.4  Third, 
some studies pursue an extensive coverage of almost all the unit trusts available within 
the evaluation period, including funds that began or ceased to exist within the period.  
Such an approach compromises on the consistency in the number of observations 
available and the observation period for each fund, making comparisons between them 
difficult.  In this paper we consider only equity-based funds that exist throughout the 
evaluation periods.  Weekly prices are used for the analysis.  In addition, recognizing the 
diversity of funds available and the importance of selecting an appropriate benchmark, we 
try to match each fund with an appropriate index according to the declared objectives of 
the fund.  To serve this purpose, we create two new benchmark indices to more 
effectively mimic the trading characteristics of certain funds.  The details are discussed in 
Section 4. 
 
3.  Methodology 
We use three different measures to assess portfolio performance, namely, the 
Sharpe Measure, the Jensen Measure and the Treynor-Mazuy Total Performance 
                                                 
4 Test runs of our data showed that the absolute returns of portfolios are significantly higher when dividends 
are reinvested. 
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Measure.  The first of these measures is a reward-to-variability (mean-standard deviation) 
evaluation while the other two rely on the beta of the fund, measuring the portfolio’s 
performance as compared to a benchmark. 
3.1 Performance Measures 
3.1.1 Sharpe Measure  
Sharpe (1966) developed the Sharpe Measure pS  as a simple way to evaluate 
portfolio performance.  His idea was to measure the amount of excess return of the 
portfolio over the risk-free rate in a given period per unit of risk.  Sharpe took the 
standard deviation of the portfolio return as the proxy for risk.  Thus, 
p f
p
p
r r
S
s
−
= ,                     (1) 
where pr  is the sample mean return of the portfolio, fr  is the risk-free rate of return for 
the given evaluation period, and ps  is the sample standard deviation of the portfolio 
return. 
The Sharpe Measure assumes ex ante mean-variance efficiency of the market 
portfolio.  Miller and Gehr (1978), however, found that the Sharpe Measure is biased 
upwards when the sample size is small (less than 12, say) and proposed a correction for 
this.  Subsequently, Jobson and Korkie (1981) suggested a simpler method of correcting 
for the bias.  This is given by: 
  


+
=
75.0N
NSS p
a
p ,              (2) 
where apS  is the adjusted Sharpe Measure and N  is the number of return observations.  
3.1.2  Jensen Measure  
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Jensen (1968) suggested that within the specification of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), the excess return of the portfolio can be written as: 
J
ptmt
J
ppt RR εβ += ,              (3) 
where ptR  and mtR  are the excess returns (above the risk-free rate) of the portfolio p and 
the market portfolio, respectively, in period t, Jpβ  is the systematic risk of portfolio p 
with respect to the market portfolio, and Jptε  is the error term with an expected value of 
zero. 
Within this framework, a manager with superior stock-picking ability will try to 
select securities that are expected to yield positive Jptε .  Thus, there should be an 
allowance for a non-zero constant to exist in equation (3), which gives us the following 
equation: 
J
ptmt
J
p
J
ppt RR εβα ~++= ,                 (4) 
where Jpβ , ptR  and mtR  are as defined in equation (3), Jpα  is the true measure of a 
manager’s stock-picking ability and Jptε~  is the error term with an expected value of zero. 
Jensen’s performance measure is given by the estimate of the vertical intercept 
J
pα  in the regression line represented by equation (4).  Fama (1972) suggested that a 
portfolio manager’s skill can be partitioned into two distinct components: the forecast of 
price movements of selected stocks and the forecast of price movements of the whole 
stock market.  The former is known as ‘security analysis’ or ‘stock picking’.  The latter is 
known as ‘market timing’, which refers to a manager’s ability to predict future economic 
conditions and adjust his portfolio’s systematic risk accordingly.  It was argued that the 
Jensen Measure in equation (4) fails to capture the distinction between these two 
components, which may allow room for biases as the measure ranks portfolio 
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performance based only on the absolute size of Jpα .  The Treynor-Mazuy Measure 
attempts to remedy this shortcoming.  
3.1.3  Treynor-Mazuy Total Performance Measure 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) argued that if portfolio managers are actively adjusting 
their portfolios’ systematic risk, they will hold larger proportion of the market portfolio 
when the return on the market is high and a smaller proportion when the return on the 
market is low.  Thus, the portfolio return is not linear but a convex function of the market 
return.  Hence, they suggested adding a quadratic term, namely, the square of the market 
return in the traditional Jensen Measure in equation (4).  Thus, we have the following 
modified equation: 
2
1 2
TM TM TM TM
pt p p mt p mt ptR R Rα β β ε= + + + ,            (5) 
where TMpα , 
TM
p1β  and TMptε are the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) measures defined similarly as 
the Jensen Measures, and TMp2β  is the coefficient that measures the fund manager’s 
response to market conditions.  Hence, the Treynor-Mazuy Total Performance Measure is 
given by: 
2
2 m
TM
p
TM
pTM σβα +=               (6) 
where 2mσ  is the variance of the benchmark portfolio return.  A large TM score will 
indicate superior security analysis and market timing ability.  In empirical applications, 
TM
pα  and 
TM
p2β  in equation (6) are replaced by their least squares estimates. 
3.2  Measuring Performance Consistency 
3.2.1 The Spearman Rank Correlation 
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To measure the consistency of the performance of the unit trusts based on various 
measures, the non-parametric Spearman Rank Correlation Measure sr  is used.  sr  is 
given by:   
2
2
6
1
( 1)
= −
−
∑  i
s
D
r
N N
,              (7) 
where N is the sample size and iD  is the difference between the rankings of portfolio i 
using two different measures (or over two different evaluation periods).  The null 
hypothesis that the two measures provide the same ranking (or the performance of the 
funds is consistent through time) can be tested using the standardized normal test 
assuming sufficiently large sample. 
3.2.2  Simulated Trading Strategies 
In addition to the Spearman Rank Correlation test, a series of simulated strategies 
are applied to the data sets to detect whether certain trading strategies can be applied to 
achieve abnormal profits. The strategies are to select the top 3 or top 5 funds based on 
either the Sharpe Measure or the absolute returns earned by the top 3 and 5 funds from 
the last evaluation period.  Based on this criterion, an investor is assumed to purchase 
these funds for the next period.  The average excess returns earned on such strategies are 
then compared with the passive strategy of trading in the Straits Times Index (STI) for the 
same period.  If there is no persistence in portfolio performance, such strategies based on 
the past performance should not generate any significant excess returns over the market. 
 
4.  Data 
4.1  Specifications 
Given the objective as explained earlier, the unit trusts selected for this study only 
consist of equity-based funds that deal with stocks traded in Singapore and the Asian 
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region (including Singapore).  This restriction limits the number of funds available for 
evaluation, but would provide a well-focused comparison of funds that are popular among 
investors.  We compare the funds over three different periods of the 90s, namely, the 10-
year period of 1990 through 1999, the 5-year period of 1995 through 1999, and the 3-year 
period of 1997 through 1999.  In the more recent periods, more funds are included in the 
study due to new additions. 
The data for this study consist of weekly price observations taken at the end of the 
week.  There are totally 36 unit trusts,5 which include funds managed by six bank’s 
investment arms and eight asset management companies.  The entire period of study is 
from January 5, 1990 to December 24, 1999.  There are a maximum of 521 observations 
for the 10-year period and a minimum of 157 observations for the 3-year period for each 
fund.  The Singapore 1-month inter-bank rate is used as the proxy for the risk-free rate in 
this study. 
The weekly fund prices (ask and bid) were obtained from the Straits Times and 
the Business Times.  Information about the funds’ dividend payments and bonus issues 
was obtained from the funds’ prospectus and/or from the respective fund managers 
through private contacts.  The risk-free interest rates were obtained from MAS and all 
regional benchmark indices, with the exception of the STI, were obtained from the Data 
Stream.  We used the STI rolled back through the evaluation period.  This series was 
obtained from the Business Times.  A list of the selected unit trusts and their respective 
benchmark indices are given in Tables B.1 in Appendix B.   Brief descriptions of the 
selected benchmark indices are given in Table B.2.   
To provide proper evaluation of the unit trust performance it is crucial that 
appropriate indices are selected as benchmarks for comparison.  The benchmarks are thus 
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carefully selected by studying the objectives and Trust Deeds of each fund based on their 
latest prospectus.  Each fund has a benchmark assigned that best matches its trading 
objectives.  In addition, two new base indices are created to more appropriately mimic the 
trading environment of the funds in question.  The two new benchmarks are: (1) the 
merger of Singapore’s STI and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index (HIS) to form the STI-HSI 
index, and (2) the merger of Singapore’s STI and the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index 
(KLCI) to form the STI-KLCI index.  The two new indices are calculated as follows: 
5050
00




+



= B
B
t
A
A
tN
t I
I
I
II              (8) 
where AtI  and 
B
tI  are the actual index figures at time t used to construct the new base 
index NtI , and 
AI0  and 
BI0  are the base-period figures for the two indices taken at the 
beginning of the evaluation period.6 
4.2  Calculation of Returns 
The portfolio return rp and the benchmark return rm are calculated for the 
evaluation periods.  The return of a portfolio is calculated based on equation (9), which 
incorporates both the bid-ask spread of each fund and the dividend payments.  We assume 
that all dividend payments are reinvested into the portfolio at the mean price *
m
tP  between 
the bid and ask prices on the ex-dividend date t*.7   Thus, the portfolio return for the 
holding period from t to t+1 is given by:8 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Note that not all funds are covered in the three evaluation periods.  See Table A.1 for the details. 
6 Note that we have adopted an equally weighted scheme for the composite index.  We expect the results to 
be insensitive to this assumption. 
7 This is also the standard (default) practice of most fund managers in treating dividend payments. 
8 For the Sharpe Measure, the holding period is the evaluation period of 3, 5 and 10 years.  For the 
regression results (for the Jensen and Treynor-Mazuy Measures) reported in Section 5, holding periods of 
13 weeks are used.  For the simulated strategies reported in Section 5, the holding period is 1 year.  The 
holding periods are applicable for the calculation in equations (9), (10) and (11). 
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t
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r
P
              (9) 
where 1+
B
tP  is the bid price at time t+1, 
A
tP  is the ask price at time t, and 1tdU +  is the 
factor representing dividend reinvestment, which is calculated as follows: 
*
1
*
1tt m
t
DdU
P+
  = +  ∏ ,                       (10) 
where *tD  is the dividend distribution of the portfolio at the ex-dividend date t*  and the 
product is taken over all ex-dividend dates between time t and t+1. 
Since all returns are calculated in percentage, bonus issues and stock splits are 
converted by multiplying the additional issues back into the prices and subsequent 
dividend payments, starting from the ex-bonus/ex-split dates till the end of the study 
period. 
The calculation of benchmark return requires a different treatment.  As there is no 
bid-ask spread in index trading, the benchmark return is calculated based on an artificial 
2% discount (transaction cost or commission) over the “selling” price as given in 
equation (11).  The dividends, however, are ignored from the calculation, since indices 
are typically reported without income.  Thus,  
10 98 t t
m
t
I I
r
I
. + −= ,            (11) 
where tI  and 1+tI  are the index values at time t and t+1, respectively.  The weekly 
observations of the Singapore 1-month inter-bank rate are first converted into effective 
rates wr  and then compounded weekly over the period of evaluation to obtain rf.  Thus,   
1 1f wr r( )= + −∏ ,            (12) 
where the product is taken over all weeks in the evaluation period. 
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To capture the portfolio return standard deviation, weekly returns based on the 
mean of the bid-ask prices are used.  The value is then multiplied by the square root of the 
number of weekly observations within the evaluation period.  Thus, the raw Sharpe 
Measure (see equation (1)) is calculated as follows: 
p f
p p
w
r r
S
s N
−
= ⋅ ,            (13) 
where pws  is the sample standard deviation of the weekly returns of the portfolio and N is 
the number of weekly observations in the evaluation period. 
Since the minimum sample size taken for the Sharpe Measure is 52 (1 year) in this 
study, the correction for the sample bias mentioned in equation (2) is trivial and should 
not have a significant effect on the ranking of the portfolios.  As such, the proposed 
correction is ignored in this study. 
We end this section by pointing out that the steps taken to maintain the same 
number of observations for each fund in the evaluation period does come with a price.  
Since funds that no longer exist at the end of the study period are left out of the 
evaluation, the selected data set will be subject to a survivorship bias.  However, there are 
various reasons as to why a particular fund ceases to exist in a particular period.  Apart 
from poor performance, other reasons include change in promotion strategies, low 
financial resources, adverse political climate and corporate takeovers.  In view of the 
various complications surrounding funds that do not “survive”, it will be intractable to 
correct for such a bias without introducing more problems to the study.  As such, we shall 
ignore the issue of survivorship bias in this study. 
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5.  Empirical Results 
5.1  Performance Evaluation 
5.1.1  Mean-Variance Analysis of Portfolio Performance 
           The mean-variance evaluation of portfolios is conducted based on the Sharpe 
Measure (or Sharpe Ratio).  This measure is calculated based on a passive buy-and-hold 
strategy of the portfolios over the evaluation periods.  The results are then compared 
against a passive index trading of the STI.  The results are summarized in Table 1. 
Though the 10-year evaluation period saw an encouraging correlation between 
portfolio risk and return, the correlation appears to be weak during the Asian Crisis.  In 
the 3-year evaluation period, the correlation between risk and return of the portfolios 
registered a mere 0.211.  However, it is interesting to note that all funds evaluated during 
the 10-year period outperformed the corresponding risk-free rate.  This supports most 
fund managers’ claim that a unit trust is a medium- to long-term (5 to 10 years or more) 
investment product designed to earn more income than that of bank deposits.  The results 
of the Sharpe Measure also suggest that portfolio managers, on average, are able to 
outperform the market and actively adjust their portfolios’ risk exposure.  
5.1.2  Beta-Based Portfolio Performance 
We now evaluate the portfolios’ performance based on beta.  This is done using 
the portfolios’ absolute score of the intercept Jpα  (the Jensen Measure) in the linear 
regression given in equation (4), and the TM score (the Treynor-Mazuy Total 
Performance Measure) of the quadratic regression given in equation (6).  These scores are 
ranked and compared with the results obtained in the previous subsection.  Both 
regressions are based on a 13-week holding period of the portfolios’ excess returns over 
their respective benchmark (as listed in Table A.1) returns.  The results are presented in 
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Table 2, Panels (a), (b) and (c) for the 10-year, 5-year and 3-year evaluation periods, 
respectively. 
From Table 2 we can see that the results are somewhat disappointing.  There are 
no significant positive scores of fund performance against their respective benchmark 
portfolios in all three evaluation periods.  Though the two beta regressions generated 
fairly similar rankings, their results differ significantly from the Sharpe Measure.  This, 
however, should not cause too much concern as the Sharpe Measure is based on the total 
risk whereas the other two measures are based on beta.9 
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some consistent performers among the three 
evaluation techniques.  The Singapore Progress Fund ranks among the worst performers 
in all three measures during all three evaluation periods.  This is disappointing as the fund 
belongs to the first and hence longest established fund management company in 
Singapore (since 1963), namely, the Singapore Unit Trust.  Experience of the firm was 
clearly not an asset for the fund’s performance. 
The Citi Asia Infrastructure Fund and the Nikko Oriental Growth Fund, which are 
only evaluated during the 3-year period, rank among the bottom five in all three 
measures.  In comparison, the Deutsche Premier Select Trust ranks among the bottom 
five in the three measures during the 5-year evaluation period.  On the other hand, there 
are also consistent top performers.  The Savers Trust Fund ranks among the top three and 
the top four funds in all three measures during the 10-year and 5-year period, 
respectively.  Also, the United Regional Growth Fund ranks fourth in all three measures 
during the 3-year period.  
                                                 
9 As pointed out by the referee, incorporating funds that have ceased to exist would likely show more funds 
with significantly negative Jensen Measures. 
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The poor overall performance of the fund managers, however, is in contrast to the 
findings in the last subsection, where fund managers are found to perform fairly well in 
risk-adjusted returns.  However, one must recognize that in a bear market, it is difficult to 
pick ‘winners’ among the numerous ‘losers’, especially considering the contagion effect 
of the Asian Crisis.  The positive risk-return results in Section 5.1.1 might be credited to 
the fund managers’ ability to adjust the portfolios’ market exposure.  This ability is 
clearly put to the test during the volatile periods of the crisis. 
       5.2  Performance Consistency  
5.2.1  Results of the Spearman Rank Correlation Test 
At this point, there is still little knowledge about the consistency in the 
performance of the portfolios over time and the results based on different performance 
measures.  To this end, non-parametric tests based on the Spearman rank correlation (as 
described in 3.2.1) are performed.  Tables 3 and 4 display the results of these tests. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 
two consecutive non-overlapping three-year evaluation periods throughout the 90s.  It can 
be seen that there is very weak correlation in the portfolios’ ranking over time.  None of 
the pairs of evaluation periods have a correlation score significant at the 5% level.  As 
such, the null hypothesis that there is no correlation over time for the performance of the 
funds cannot be rejected.  
 Table 4 summarizes the Spearman rank correlation on the different performance 
measures over the three-, five-, and ten-year evaluation periods as reported in Table 2.  As 
expected, the Jensen and Treynor-Mazuy measures are highly correlated.  In contrast, for 
the Treynor-Mazur and Sharpe comparison and the Jensen and Sharpe comparison, 
significant correlation is found only in the three-year evaluation period. 
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5.2.2  Results of Simulated Strategies based on Past Performance 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, a series of simulated strategies are tested based on 
the results of the portfolios’ Sharpe scores in Section 5.1.1 and their absolute returns to 
examine the existence of “hot hands” in the industry.  In the first week of each period, an 
investor is assumed to purchase the top 3 (or top 5) funds based on the information of the 
funds’ performance in the previous period.  The funds are then sold in the first week of 
the next period and at the same time the top 3 (or top 5) performers for that period are 
purchased and held till the first week of the subsequent period and so on.  
These strategies are repeated five times consecutively using annual holding 
periods beginning from 1995.  These five separate returns from the annual trading are 
then added up to give a 5-year strategy return.  The average returns of the funds are then 
compared with the passive strategy of holding the STI throughout.  The results are 
presented in Table 5. 
From Table 5 it appears that “hot hands” do exist in the fund management 
industry over the 5-year period of study when the strategy based on selecting the top three 
funds is applied.10  Based on past performance, an investor can make supernormal profits 
over and above the STI by purchasing the top 3 performing funds in the previous period.  
The strategy based on selecting the top five funds, however, is not successful.  Above all, 
the strategies showed that an investor could make abnormal profits based on just the 
absolute returns of the evaluated portfolios, which is a very crude measure of investment 
performance.11  
 
                                                 
10 As one might have noticed, the annual returns of the top 3 funds based on either the Sharpe scores or the 
absolute returns are the same.  This is so because they consist of the same funds (though their ranking 
among the top 3 positions may differ). 
11 Note, however, that the strategy only works on average in the 5-year period.  The results are different if 
the returns are compared annually. 
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5.3  Diversification of Portfolios 
Koh, Koh and Cheng (1990) found that the unit trusts in Singapore were generally 
poorly diversified. Though the actual benchmarks selected were not displayed in their 
paper, their results showed that the R-squared statistic of the 19 unit trusts evaluated had a 
mean of just 0.25, with a maximum of 0.47.  They concluded that investors were better 
off buying stocks across the board themselves.  However, our study, which was set in the 
90s, displayed a very different picture.  The coefficient of determination (R-squared) of 
our evaluated portfolios registers a mean above 0.80.  This shows substantial 
improvements in the diversification of the unit trusts in the last decade. 
 
6.  Implications of Results and Further Discussions 
We have adopted an unconditional approach to fund evaluation.  The 
characteristics of the funds are assumed to be unchanged throughout the evaluation 
period.  There is appeal in using a conditional approach as adopted by Ferson and Schadt 
(1996), which takes account of changing economic conditions.  The success of the 
conditional approach, however, depends on the construction of a factor model.  Given the 
relatively short evaluation period we have used in this study, an unconditional approach 
may circumvent the difficulty of a reliable factor model. 
At present, firms such as Standard & Poor’s and Standard Chartered Investment 
Services conduct performance analysis of unit trusts in Singapore and bestow annual 
awards honoring top performers.  However, their selected benchmarks and evaluation 
methodology are usually undisclosed.  Fund managers tend to advertise the awards they 
receive for their performance in a particular year.  However, our study demonstrates that 
yearly analysis may not be a very good indicator of future performance.  Furthermore, the 
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performance comparison may differ significantly depending on the selected evaluation 
methodology and the selected benchmarks for the portfolios.  
The top performer on a particular year might not perform as well (within top 5) in 
the next.  Examples in our study are the Savers Enhanced Trust Fund and the Schroder 
Singapore Trust.  The former ranked second by the Sharpe Measure in 1997 but fell to 
twenty-second in 1998, while the latter ranked thirty-third in 1997 but made its way up to 
the first spot in 1998.  Nonetheless, our results show that some funds do manage to repeat 
their performance.  Based on the Sharpe Measure, the CMG F S Singapore Growth Fund 
performed consistently above average, year-on-year, while the Singapore Progress Fund 
performed consistently below average, year-on-year.  Furthermore, the results on the 
simulated strategies demonstrate that past performance could be utilized to formulate 
profitable long-term investment strategies. 
The poor performance of the fund managers can be in part explained by the lack 
of talent in the industry.  Singapore does have a reasonable number of Chartered 
Financial Analysts (CFA).  However, over a fifth of these CFAs are hired by the GIC, 
while the rest mainly work under broker-dealer investment banking (which offers very 
competitive pay).  There are only a few CFAs in the local fund management industry 
holding positions of importance.  The lack of talent in the industry does in part account 
for its poor performance. 
Due to its unique properties, investment advisors are actively recommending unit 
trusts to be included as part of their clients’ investment mix.  Furthermore, there is also an 
explosive growth in insurance-linked unit trusts in recent years,12 where agents use its 
properties to plan long-term investment packages along with their life insurance policies.  
                                                 
12 Ten years ago, insurance-linked unit trusts were unheard of in Singapore.  Now, they account for 21.6% 
of the total unit trusts available. 
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Unit trusts are likely to play a dominant role here as an investment option in the near 
future.  Thus, in light of the performance-reward imbalances in the fund management 
industry, perhaps more funds should introduce performance fees as partial substitutes for 
the management fees they charge.  This is especially relevant to funds that incorporate a 
Regular Savings Plan (RSP) for their investors.  Under such a plan, an investor will 
continue his/her periodic contributions to the fund unless otherwise stated.  With long-
term savings purpose in mind, investors’ demand for the fund is unlikely to change due to 
poor performance of the fund manager for a particular year. This may result in 
complacency of the management.  If performance fees are introduced, investors will have 
a built-in system to check the managers’ performance.  However, for this to work, there 
are necessary details to be ironed out.  Foremost, there must be an agreed form of 
assessment of fund performance.  Mandatory reporting standards and performance should 
be considered to keep investors adequately informed. 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
In view of the phenomenal growth in the fund management industry in the 90s this 
study seeks to obtain evidence of unit trust performance.  Our results show that fund 
managers in general performed poorly in security analysis and market timing.  However, 
they performed fairly well in risk-adjusted returns and generally maintained well-
diversified portfolios.  We find that there is evidence of repeat performance of some top 
funds, which makes it possible to formulate long-term strategies to make supernormal 
profits.  Our analysis also shows that fund managers can indeed make excess returns 
above the risk-free rate in the medium- to long-term.  Thus, unit trusts could be an ideal 
investment for small investors seeking sufficient diversification. 
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Table 1:  Summary of the Sharpe Measure Analysis 
 
No. of Funds that outperformed 
the STI in 
Evaluation 
Period 
Total 
no. of 
Funds 
No. of Funds that 
outperformed the 
Risk Free Rate Absolute 
returns 
Sharpe 
Measure 
Correlation 
between risk 
and return 
10-year 11 11 (100%) 6 (55%) 7 (64%) 0.790 
5-year 22 15 (68%) 13 (59%) 15 (68%) 0.296 
3-year 36 22 (61%) 17 (47%) 21 (58%) 0.211 
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Table 2:  Performance Comparison Based on Beta and Total Risk 
 
Panel (a): Ten-Year Evaluation Period, 1990 – 1999 
 
 
Unit Trusts 
 
Jensen 
Alpha 
Rank TM 
Score 
Rank Sharpe 
Ratio 
Rank 
Shenton Thrift Fund 0.0143 1 0.0143 1 0.60 10 
Savers Trust Fund -0.0126 2 -0.0127 2 1.97 3 
CMG F S Asia Pacific Growth Fund -0.0145 3 -0.0145 3 1.97 2 
CMG F S Singapore Growth Fund -0.0153 4 -0.0153 4 3.34 1 
Savers Capital Fund -0.0161 5 -0.0161 5 1.01 6 
Unifund -0.0178 6 -0.0179 6 1.55 5 
Union Singapore Fund -0.0211 7 -0.0214 7 0.77 7 
Union Investment Fund -0.0225* 8 -0.0227 8 1.65 4 
The Savings Fund -0.0412* 9 -0.0411 9 0.62 9 
Singapore Equity Fund -0.0434* 10 -0.0433 10 0.67 8 
Singapore Progress Fund -0.0475* 11 -0.0474 11 0.17 11 
Average Score -0.0220 -0.0216 1.30 
 
Note: Asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Panel (b): Five-Year Evaluation Period, 1995 – 1999 
 
 
Unit Trusts 
 
Jensen 
Alpha 
Rank TM 
Score 
Rank Sharpe 
Ratio 
Rank 
Keppel Asia Blue Chip Fund  0.0242 1 0.0254 1 0.25 12 
Shenton Thrift Fund 0.0174 2 0.0174 2 0.35 8 
Savers AsPac Recovery Fund -0.0103 3 -0.0102 3 -0.01 16 
Savers Trust Fund -0.0106 4 -0.0113 5 0.96 2 
Schroder Singapore Trust -0.0120 5 -0.0109 4 0.96 3 
Schroder Asian Growth Fund -0.0136 6 -0.0133 6 0.48 6 
Deutsche Asia Premier Trust -0.015 7 -0.0155 8 0.80 4 
CMG F S Singapore Growth Fund -0.0150 8 -0.0153 7 1.30 1 
Savers Capital Fund -0.0184 9 -0.0182 9 0.22 13 
CMG F S Asia Pacific Growth Fund -0.0208 10 -0.0215 12 -0.14 19 
United Asia Fund -0.0210* 11 -0.0210 10 0.32 10 
Shenton Asia Pacific Fund -0.0218 12 -0.0213 11 -0.30 22 
United Growth Fund -0.0234* 13 -0.0230 13 0.33 9 
Union Singapore Fund -0.0274 14 -0.0282 14 0.03 15 
Union Investment Fund -0.0277 15 -0.0285 15 0.62 5 
Shenton Twin City Fund -0.0314 16 -0.0316 16 0.39 7 
Unifund -0.0334 17 -0.0341 17 -0.27 21 
Singapore Equity Fund -0.0377 18 -0.0380 19 0.32 11 
Union East Asian Fund -0.0381* 19 -0.0378 18 0.03 14 
The Savings Fund -0.0421* 20 -0.0417 20 -0.06 17 
Deutsche Premier Select Trust -0.0443* 21 -0.0458 21 -0.19 20 
Singapore Progress Fund -0.0461* 22 -0.0464 22 -0.08 18 
Average Score -0.0213 -0.0214 0.29 
 
Note: Asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Panel (c): Three-Year Evaluation Period, 1997 – 1999 
 
 
Unit Trusts 
 
Jensen 
Alpha 
Rank TM 
Score 
Rank Sharpe 
Ratio 
Rank 
Five Arrows Asian Enterprise Trust 0.0333 1 0.0237 3 0.59 13 
Keppel Asia Blue Chip Fund  0.0272 2 0.0297 1 0.40 17 
Shenton Thrift Fund 0.0252 3 0.0241 2 0.60 12 
United Regional Growth Fund 0.0166 4 0.0145 4 1.21 4 
Govett Asia Pacific Growth Fund 0.0126 5 0.0077 6 0.63 11 
Singapore Equity Fund 0.0098 6 0.0104 5 1.6 1 
Savers Trust Fund 0.0009 7 -0.0025 8 1.24 3 
United Apec Equity Fund 0.0005 8 -0.0028 9 1.46 2 
Schroder Singapore Trust 0.0001 9 0.0023 7 1.14 5 
Keppel South East Asia Fund -0.0047 10 -0.0031 11 0.79 9 
Savers Enhanced Trust Fund -0.0052 11 -0.0061 12 0.48 16 
Keppel Singapore/Malaysia Fund -0.0061 12 -0.0029 10 0.68 10 
Union Enhanced Fund -0.0107 13 -0.0150 16 1.05 6 
Schroder Asian Growth Fund -0.0110 14 -0.0102 13 0.22 20 
Deutsche Asia Premier Trust -0.0112 15 -0.0131 14 0.53 15 
CMG F S Singapore Growth Fund -0.0134 16 -0.0150 17 0.79 8 
Savers Asia Infrastructure Fund -0.0147 17 -0.0147 15 0.00 23 
United Growth Fund -0.0161 18 -0.0155 18 0.53 14 
United Asia Fund -0.0167 19 -0.0171 20 0.20 21 
Savers AsPac Recovery Fund -0.0178 20 -0.0165 19 -0.10 26 
CMG F S Asia Pacific Growth Fund -0.0218 21 -0.0233 23 -0.23 29 
Union Investment Fund -0.0220 22 -0.0254 24 0.88 7 
Savers Capital Fund -0.0221 23 -0.0211 21 -0.12 27 
Shenton Global Opportunities Fund -0.0242 24 -0.0268 25 -0.49 32 
Union Singapore Fund -0.0247 25 -0.0280 26 0.24 18 
Keppel Asia Fund -0.0277 26 -0.0215 22 -0.24 31 
Shenton Asia Pacific Fund -0.0320 27 -0.0295 27 -0.54 34 
Union East Asian Fund -0.0324 28 -0.0319 28 0.13 22 
Shenton Twin City Fund -0.0343 29 -0.0347 29 -0.13 28 
Singapore Equity Fund -0.0360 30 -0.0378 30 0.23 19 
Unifund -0.0400 31 -0.0421 32 -0.52 33 
Nikko Oriental Growth Fund -0.0420* 32 -0.0417 31 -0.64 35 
The Savings Fund -0.0442 33 -0.0426 33 -0.07 25 
Deutsche Premier Select Trust -0.0454* 34 -0.0503 34 -0.05 24 
Singapore Progress Fund -0.0526 35 -0.0529 35 -0.24 30 
Citi Asia Infrastructure Fund -0.0556* 36 -0.0574 36 -0.93 36 
Average Score -0.0160 -0.0164 0.31 
 
Note: Asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 3: Spearman Rank Correlation on the Sharpe Measure 
 
Evaluation Period Correlation 
90-92 vs. 93-95 0.2818 
91-93 vs. 94-96 0.1818 
92-94 vs. 95-97 0.3636 
93-95 vs. 96-98 0.2364 
94-96 vs. 97-99 -0.3818 
 
Notes: None of the correlation is significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4: Spearman Rank Correlation on Different Performance Measures 
 
 Jensen vs. TM TM vs. Sharpe Jensen vs. Sharpe 
10-year period 1.0000* 0.4818 0.4818 
5-year period 0.9932* 0.4952 0.4896 
3-year period 0.9910* 0.7524* 0.7810* 
 
Note: Asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 5: Simulated Average Return versus Return of the Buy-and-Hold Strategy  
 
Buy Top 3 Performing 
Funds Based on 
Buy Top 5 Performing 
Funds Based on 
Holding 
Period 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Scores 
Absolute 
Returns 
STI 
Returns 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Scores 
Absolute 
Returns 
STI 
Returns 
1995 -0.0524 -0.0524 0.0134 -0.0387 -0.0489 0.0134 
1996 0.0745 0.0745 0.0054 0.0448 0.0158 0.0054 
1997 -0.3295 -0.3295 -0.2636 -0.3141 -0.3141 -0.2636 
1998 -0.0964 -0.0964 -0.0764 -0.1223 -0.1148 -0.0764 
1999 0.8581 0.8581 0.7215 0.7862 0.7999 0.7215 
Total 0.4543 0.4543 0.4003 0.3559 0.3379 0.4003 
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Appendix A 
 
Fee Structure and Tax Regulations of the Fund Management Industry in Singapore 
 
 
Commission 
 
As of October 1, 2000 broking houses are allowed to set their own commission rates.  For 
the time relevant to our study, commission rates were set at 1%.  The clearing fees 
charged by the Stock Exchange of Singapore is 0.05%. Both the clearing and brokerage 
fees are subject to 3% GST (goods and services tax). 
 
Sales Charges 
 
By law, the cap on sales or preliminary charges is 5% of the value of the investment. 
Local fund managers charge different rates, depending on the investment size, nature of 
the portfolio’s investment and the promotional periods.  However, preliminary rates 
usually average around 4 - 5%. 
 
Fees Payable by Fund to Manager & Trustee 
 
Unit trusts in Singapore charge a relatively high management fee compared to their 
foreign counterparts.  By law, the maximum fee chargeable is 1.25 - 1.5%, depending on 
the type of fund involved.  In practice, many local fund managers in the selected 
portfolios charge the maximum rate of 1.25 - 1.5%.  The management fee is inclusive of 
the fees payable to the trustee.  Currently, an industrial average of 0.1% is payable to the 
trustee, subject to a minimum of $20,000 and a maximum of 0.15%.  
 
Taxation 
 
With respect to the fund, the following incomes are exempt from tax: (1) gains on sale of 
securities, (2) interest income (other than interest for which Singapore tax has been 
deducted at source by the payer), and (3) dividends derived from outside Singapore and 
received in Singapore.  The gross amount of Singapore dividends and interest subject to 
Singapore withholding tax is taxable in the fund but credit is available for the tax 
deducted at source resulting in no further tax liability for the fund. 
 
With respect to unit holders, no tax is withheld on distributions made.  Distribution out of 
the above income to unit holders who are qualified as non-residents is free from further 
Singapore tax. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1: List of Unit Trusts and Their Selected Benchmark Indices 
 
 
Launch  Period of Study Benchmark Indices Firms: Unit Trusts 
Date 97-99 95-99 90-99  
AIB Govet (Asia)      
• Govett Asia Pacific Growth Fund 22-Nov-95 9   MSCI AC Asia Pacific 
Aberdeen Asset Management Asia      
• Singapore Equity Fund$ 22-Oct-96 9   Straits Times Index 
 (Singapore Growth Fund)      
Citibank Global Asset Management      
• Citi Asia Infrastructure Fund 13-Dec-94 9   MSCI AC Far East ex Japan 
CMG First State Singapore      
• CMG F S Asia Pacific Growth Fund 10-Oct-84 9 9 9 MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan 
• CMG F S Singapore Growth Fund$ 10-Oct-84 9 9 9 Straits Times Index 
DBS Asset Management      
• Shenton Asia Pacific Fund$ 14-Aug-92 9 9  MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan 
• Shenton Thrift Fund$ 13-Aug-87 9 9 9 Straits Times Index 
• Shenton Global Opportunities Fund$ 13-Nov-96 9   MSCI AC Asia Pacific 
 (Shenton Asian Opportunities Fund)      
• Shenton Twin City Fund 01-Mar-93 9 9  STI-HS 
Keppel Investment Management       
 Keppel Singapore/Malaysia Fund 09-Jan-96 9   STI-KLCI 
 (Tat Lee Cash Value Fund)      
• Keppel South East Asia Fund$ 
(Tat Lee Basic Value Fund) 
09-Jan-96 9   BT Singapore Regional Index 
• Keppel Asia Fund$ 11-Mar-96 9   MSCI AC Far East free 
 (Orientrust Fund)      
• Keppel Asia Blue Chip Fund$ 25-Jul-94 9 9  MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan 
 (Enhance Fund)      
Deutsche Asset Management      
(Morgan Grenfell Investement Management)      
• Deutsche Asia Premier Trust$ 01-Oct-94 9 9  MSCI AC Far East ex Japan 
• Deutsche Premier Select Trust$ 30-Nov-93 9 9  Straits Times Index 
 (Deutsche Singapore Premier Trust)      
Nikko Capital Management      
• Nikko Oriental Growth Fund 10-Oct-95 9   MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Free 
OCBC Asset Management      
• Savers AsPac Recovery Fund 18-Feb-93 9 9  MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan 
• Savers Capital Fund 27-Apr-87 9 9 9 STI-KLCI 
• Savers Enhanced Trust Fund$ 19-Apr-95 9   MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan 
• Savers Trust Fund$ 28-Feb-89 9 9 9 Straits Times Index 
• Savers Asia Infrastructure Fund 28-Mar-96 9   MSCI AC Far East ex Japan 
OUB Asset Management      
• Union East Asian Fund 31-Mar-87 9 9  MSCI AC Far East ex Japan 
• Union Singapore Fund 17-Apr-80 9 9 9 Straits Times Index 
• Union Investment Fund$ 01-Jun-89 9 9 9 Straits Times Index 
• Union Enhanced Fund$ 18-Jul-95 9   Straits Times Index 
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Rothschild Asset Management      
• Five Arrows Asian Enterprise Trust$ 22-Aug-95 9   MSCI Far East  Small Cap 
Schroder Investment Management      
• Schroder Asian Growth Fund 08-May-91 9 9  MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Free 
 (Schroder South East Asia Fund)      
• Schroder Singapore Trust$ 01-Feb-93 9 9  Straits Times Index 
Singapore Unit Trusts      
• Singapore Progress Fund 16-Mar-70 9 9 9 Straits Times Index 
• Singapore Equity Fund 12-Feb-79 9 9 9 Straits Times Index 
• The Savings Fund 07-Jul-65 9 9 9 Straits Times Index 
UOB Asset Management      
• United Apec Equity Fund 01-Nov-95 9   MSCI AC Asia Pacific 
• United Asia Fund$ 01-Apr-92 9 9  MSCI AC Far East ex Japan 
• Unifund 01-Jun-86 9 9 9 STI-KLCI 
• United Regional Growth Fund$ 01-Mar-95 9   BT Singapore Regional Index 
• United Growth Fund$ 01-Mar-90 9 9  Straits Times Index 
TOTAL  36 22 11  
   
Notes:  
 
1) The term in parentheses refers to the name for which the fund was formerly known. 
2) $ represents CPF-approved unit trusts. 
3) STI-KLCI and STI-HS represent, respectively, the composite indices based on the Straits Times Index 
and the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index, and the Straits Times Index and the Hang Seng Index.  See 
equation (8) in the text for the formula used in the computation of these composite indices. 
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TABLE B.2: List of Selected Benchmark Indices and Their Description 
 
Benchmark Indices Index Description 
 
Straits Times Index A value-weighted index of 55 stocks traded on the Stock Exchange of Singapore. 
 
BT Singapore Regional 
Index 
A market value-weighted index of 34 SES-listed stocks with substantial exposure to the 
region.  
 
Hang Seng Index A barometer of the Hong Kong stock market.  
 
Kuala Lumpur Composite 
Index 
A broad-based capitalization-weighted index designed to measure the performance of the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
 
MSCI AC Asia Pacific An index tracking the performance of stocks traded in 15 countries in the Asia Pacific 
Region. 
 
MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex 
Japan 
 
Same composition as MSCI AC Asia Pacific excluding Japan. 
MSCI AC Asia ex Japan 
Free 
An index tracking the performance of stocks traded in 11 countries in Asia excluding 
Japan. 
 
MSCI AC Far East ex 
Japan 
 
An index tracking the performance of stocks traded in 9 countries in the Far East region 
excluding Japan 
 
MSCI AC Far East Free An index tracking the performance of stocks traded in 11 countries in Asia. 
 
MSCI Far East Small Cap An index for monitoring the performance of the small companies’ universe of securities 
in the Far East region. 
 
 
 
